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1.  Introduction 
This paper models the effect of the tax system and financial reporting principles 
on the real and accounting decisions of corporations.  Its purpose is to enhance our 
understanding of the effects of taxation and accounting on corporate behavior by merging 
the approach taken by economists and accountants.  Economists typically study the 
effects of taxes on real decisions, ignoring the role of financial reporting.
1  Accountants 
usually focus on the coordination of tax and accounting choices, with little attention to 
real economic effects (see review in Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001).
2  Both approaches 
yield important insights, but neither is complete because tax and accounting decisions 
interact in important ways that affect real decisions.  For example, a given tax policy may 
induce a real response that, in turn, facilitates advantageous financial disclosures. As a 
result, studies of real choices that ignore the incentives, constraints, and interaction of 
taxes and financial reporting may lead to spurious conclusions.  Therefore, a unifying 
framework that incorporates both tax and accounting choices is needed to interpret 
corporate behavior. 
This paper provides a first step toward joint evaluation of taxation and financial 
reporting in the standard economic analyses of corporate behavior.  It develops a 
framework that formalizes the idea that the attractiveness of some real decisions is 
enhanced because they provide managers with discretion over the timing of taxable 
income and/or book income.  The key finding is that, to the extent managers value 
flexibility in their tax and financial reporting, they are more likely to make real decisions 
that provide discretion.  This desire for flexibility modifies the optimal decisions of firms, 
in theory, and we provide examples that illustrate this behavior in the real world.  
                                                 
1 An extensive empirical literature in economics explores the effects of taxes on numerous real decisions.  
For a sample of the work, see reviews of investment decisions in Hassett and Hubbard (2002) and Hassett 
and Newmark (2006) and corporate finance in Graham (2003). 
2 Slemrod’s (1992) trichotomy of behavioral responses to taxation illustrates the division between the tax 
work of economists and accountants: (1) real responses—the traditional domain of economists; (2) 
responses that reshuffle, relabel, or recharacterize the real activities of the taxpayer—the traditional domain 
of accountants; and (3) timing responses that take advantage of changing tax rules or rates—which both 
groups have studied to a limited extent.     2 
The paper proceeds in the following manner:  Section 2 covers five topics around 
which we build the model.  First, we discuss the fundamental role that information plays 
in both taxation and financial accounting.  Both tax returns and financial statements 
convey inside information to outside stakeholders about the profitability of the firm, and 
these information asymmetries between the insiders and the external users are central to 
our modeling approach.  Second, we develop the link between information and the 
corporate income tax.  We note the administrative efficiencies of collecting large sums of 
tax from organizations with advanced information systems.  However, they must be 
balanced against the opportunities for tax avoidance that this information provides.  
Third, we review the tax research in accounting that investigates whether firms will pay 
taxes to achieve accounting goals.  Fourth, we discuss the tax and financial reporting 
costs associated with differences in accounting earnings and taxable income.  Finally, we 
review the role that book-tax conformity plays in tax and accounting decisions.      
Section 3 develops our model.  Our objective is to provide a framework, as well 
as a vocabulary, that illustrates how accounting conventions and the tax law affect real 
business decisions.  Among other results, we find that value arises from real decisions 
that provide firms with discretion in their tax and financial reporting.   
Examples of this value follow in Section 4.  Specifically, we examine how the 
value of discretion can provide incentives for firms to undertake more risky investments, 
to move their operations abroad, and to invest in activities with high legal and factual 
ambiguity.  We discuss some policy implications in Section 5, and offer some concluding 
remarks in Section 6.   3 
2.  Building Blocks for the Model 
2.1.  Information 
Information (particularly information asymmetry) is at the core of the modern 
normative economics approach to taxation, known as optimal tax theory.  According to 
optimal tax theory, if the tax authority could costlessly observe everything about 
taxpayers, taxes could be collected with no excess burden because individual tax liability 
could be based on an inalterable correlate of individual well being, call it ability.  
Because ability cannot be measured well, governments must base tax liability on 
alterable second-best correlates of well-being such as income, consumption, or wealth.  
Because they are alterable, taxing them causes behavioral responses and therefore 
inefficiency.  Thus, measurement and information are at the core of the normative 
economics theory of taxation. 
Information is also at the core of financial accounting.  The purpose of financial 
accounting is to provide information about business organizations.  This information is 
central to the management of public corporations because hired, professional managers 
(rather than shareholders) exercise day-to-day control.  These managers know more about 
the business than most shareholders do.  Financial reports are a means by which 
managers convey their inside knowledge to external investors, reducing the information 
asymmetries and thus lowering the cost of obtaining capital.  Financial accounting aids in 
the design of formal and informal contracting arrangements that induce managers to 
pursue shareholder-value-maximizing behavior, facilitates shareholder monitoring of 
business operations, and supplies a wide array of contractible variables that can be used 
to construct management compensation plans designed to align the interests of 
shareholders and managers.   
Publicly-held U.S. companies have to provide financial information to two 
different audiences, each of whom has a stake in assessing how much income is being 
generated.  One is a public accounting, to the firm’s stakeholders: investors, creditors, 
customers, suppliers, employees, regulators, and rating services, among others.  The other 
is a nonpublic accounting, to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).   
The IRS can see the public financial statements, which helps the IRS to better 
detect any understatement of taxable income.  The value of seeing the public financial   4 
statements has been enhanced by the new Schedule M-3 of the tax return, which requires 
the company to provide detailed information that reconciles the information on the 
financial statements to the information on the tax return.  Although investors cannot see 
the tax return and firms are not required to disclose any information from the tax return, 
including taxable income or the actual tax they pay, investors receive some information 
about taxes in the financial statements.   
Firms report a different measure of income to each audience.  The income 
reported in financial reports may differ from taxable income for at least three reasons.  
First, there are explicit differences in the intent of the two reports.  Financial statements 
are designed to reduce asymmetric information problems through reliable and relevant 
disclosures.  The tax return reflects policy that balances (often competing) economic 
objectives of equity, efficiency, and simplicity as well as political objectives to reward 
favored constituencies.  Given the differences in the purposes of the financial statements 
and the tax return, it is not surprising that the most useful measure of a firm’s profitability 
for shareholders usually differs from the most useful measure of profitability for the 
taxing authorities.   
A second reason why book income and taxable income may differ is that while 
financial accounting strives to record the underlying economics of a transaction in an 
objective and verifiable way, much of the tax system is designed to induce or reward 
particular behavior.  For example, for book purposes, the value of the firm’s equipment is 
depreciated (an expense that reduces book income) each period based on estimates of the 
equipment’s deterioration.  For tax purposes, the value of the firm’s equipment is 
depreciated (a deduction that reduces taxable income) each period by a statutorily 
determined amount, which may be intentionally altered by legislation to encourage 
acquisition of plant and equipment.  Because the statutory depreciation for tax purposes 
generally differs from the estimate for financial reporting of the equipment’s actual 
deterioration, book income and taxable income will differ. 
A third reason why book income and taxable income may differ is that there are 
incentives to mislead both the audience for the financial statements and the audience for 
the tax return (i.e., the IRS) about ongoing operations.  Both the tax return and the 
financial statement are snapshots of what the corporation wants some audience—either   5 
the IRS or the investing public—to see.  For example, in a given year, firms may have 
particularly large incentives to look more profitable to their investors.  Returning to the 
depreciation example, because determining deterioration is an imprecise process, 
managers have some leeway in the amount of book depreciation that they record.  Thus, 
book depreciation becomes a means of managing book earnings, further creating 
differences in the two measures of income. 
Both the IRS and the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), which regulates 
public financial disclosures, have safeguards to protect against misleading reports.  To 
ensure that it is receiving its appropriate share, the IRS receives millions of 
confidential—albeit potentially misleading—reports from businesses about their 
earnings.  Audit decisions are based on comparisons of tax returns across time for the 
same taxpayer, across similar taxpayers in the same year, and with the information in the 
firm’s financial statements. 
On the book side, the SEC receives financial statements from all publicly-traded 
corporations.  The financial disclosures must conform to Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP).  Penalties for failure to comply include restating prior statements, 
losing access to the public capital markets, and criminal proceedings against managers.   
GAAP comprises accounting conventions that have evolved over decades to 
provide guidance about the information that firms should disclose through their financial 
reports.  GAAP provides a structure for identifying, evaluating, and reporting the firm’s 
activities so that financial disclosures are relevant, reliable, comparable, and consistent.  
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), with oversight from the SEC, is the 
primary standard setter of GAAP.  The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the SEC itself also contribute to 
GAAP.  Each body promulgates statements to guide accountants who produce financial 
reports.  Some standards mandate specific accounting treatment for a transaction.  Other 
pronouncements suggest an approach or a structure for reporting transactions.     
To summarize, any model of the impact of taxes on real and accounting decisions 
must begin by considering the role of information for both taxation and financial 
accounting.  Firms report information about their operations to both the taxing authorities 
and the capital markets.  The information in the two reports differs because the users   6 
differ and the firms’ incentives differ.  Although firms have some leeway in the 
information that they provide in tax returns and financial statements, both the IRS and the 
SEC limit their discretion by monitoring reports and ensuring that they are in line with 
the rules. 
 
2.2.  Corporate Income Taxation 
In addition to its centrality for both tax and accounting, information is a principal 
justification for the corporate income tax.  Rather than collect revenue from millions of 
shareholders and employees, the corporate income tax takes advantage of advanced 
accounting systems, already in place for non-tax reasons, to collect revenue from a 
relatively small number of corporations.  Thus, in modern economies, large corporations 
serve important roles in the remittance of funds to the tax authority and the transmittal of 
tax-related information from the private to the public sector.  As Bird (2002) has put it so 
eloquently, “The key to effective taxation is information, and the key to information in 
the modern economy is the corporation.  The corporation is thus the modern fiscal state’s 
equivalent of the customs barrier at the border.”  That said, the same advanced 
accounting systems, which produce the information that makes the corporation an 
efficient tax collector, facilitate sophisticated tax avoidance, challenging the notion that 
the corporation is still an efficient node of collection of tax triggered by income.   
Information asymmetry also affects the firm’s tax aggressiveness.  Consider this 
question: Would managers be as tax-aggressive if the tax savings from aggressiveness 
accrued directly to the shareholders by lowering their personal tax liability?  If the answer 
to this question is that they would be equally tax-aggressive, then the point of collection 
is immaterial.  However, if the answer is no, then tax savings that accrue directly to the 
shareholders would not, on average, be pursued quite as aggressively by public 
corporations, and devolving remittance responsibility to shareholders might inhibit 
aggressiveness.  A similar issue pertains to the management of book earnings—do the 
benefits accrue to managers, or shareholders, or both?  Is earnings management   7 
opportunistic behavior by managers or does it improve the quality of communication, 
e.g., distinguishing permanent and transitory earnings?
3   
 
2.3.  Book-Tax Trade-offs 
We now shift from the role of information in tax and accounting to the largest 
body of tax research in accounting, studies of the effects of non-tax considerations on tax 
decisions.
4  This literature builds on Scholes and Wolfson’s (1992) insight that tax 
strategies affect other organizational goals and cannot be evaluated in isolation.  Their 
work implies, inter alia, that tax minimization is generally not an optimal business 
strategy.   
The non-tax consideration of primary interest to accountants is the financial 
reporting costs.  Shackelford and Shevlin (2001, p.326) define financial reporting costs as 
“those costs, real or perceived, related to reporting lower income or shareholders’ 
equity.”
5  These financial reporting costs often conflict with tax minimization because 
reductions in taxable income frequently result in lower book profits and/or equity.
6  This 
tension forces firms to trade-off book and tax considerations.  A primary finding in this 
literature is that firms will pay taxes (or forgo tax savings) to reduce financial reporting 
costs.
7   
There are at least two reasons why accounting information may be important to 
managers.
8  First, many contracts, e.g., executive compensation, rely on the firm’s 
accounting information to specify the terms of trade.  If these contracts do not or cannot 
undo the potentially adverse book effects of tax-optimal strategies, then the accounting 
                                                 
3 For further discussion, see Dechow and Skinner (2000, footnote 9), Abarbanell (2002), and Abarbanell 
and Lehavy (2003, footnote 3).  
4 See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a review of this literature. 
5 A substantial portion of accounting research, outside the tax field, focuses on financial reporting costs.  
For reviews, see Kothari (2001) and Healy and Palepu (2001).   
6 For expositional purposes, in the remainder of the paper we will refer to the income statement effects of 
the financial reporting costs.  However, any references to financial reporting costs should be interpreted as 
including all financial reporting costs associated with other disclosures in the financial statements. 
7 The research documenting that firms will pay taxes to reduce financial reporting costs is a subset of a 
larger body of knowledge showing that firms will pay cash (both through taxes and other means) to reduce 
financial reporting costs.  For example, Lys and Vincent (1995), estimate that AT&T paid an additional 
$500 million in its 1991 acquisition of NCR solely to ensure adoption of an accounting treatment (pooling 
of interests) that would boost book income in future years, but would never affect cash flows.   
8 See Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) for extensive evidence that managers care about accounting 
earnings.  Among other findings, they report that 78 percent of corporate executives report sacrificing long-
term firm value to “smooth” (i.e., reduce the variability in) earnings.     8 
disclosures may affect behavior.  Second, if the users of financial statements cannot 
distinguish between low earnings arising from poor profitability and low earnings arising 
from tax plans that increase cash flow at the expense of accounting earnings, then 
managers may be unwilling to minimize real taxes paid.  More precisely, if managers 
believe that the users cannot distinguish, then they may forgo the perceived-unobservable 
tax benefits to enhance the observable book earnings. 
Most book-tax trade-off studies identify settings where book income and taxable 
income are accounted for the same, e.g., if book income increases, then taxable income 
increases.  The studies typically measure the extent to which firm forgo tax minimization 
because of financial reporting considerations, i.e., pay taxes to produce more favorable 
financial statements.  They attempt to quantify the forgone tax savings of given decision 
that increase book income, sometimes estimating an “exchange rate” between book 
income and taxable income.   
Two decades of the trade-off studies have produced substantial evidence across 
industries, transactions, countries and time that firms are willing to remit taxes (or forgo 
tax savings) to reduce financial reporting costs.  Although space constraints prevent us 
from providing a thorough review of these book-tax studies, we briefly mention three 
studies to provide a flavor of this work: 
 
•  Examining a set of firms that fraudulently overstated their earnings, Erickson, 
Hanlon, and Maydew (2004) report that, on average, these firms paid 11 cents in 
additional federal taxes for every additional dollar of fraudulent accounting 
earnings.  
 
•  Matsunaga, Shevlin and Shores (1992) show that corporations could have lowered 
their tax liability by disqualifying their incentive stock options (i.e., converting 
them to non-qualified options) following the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  However, 
the disqualification would have lowered book earnings.  They estimate that the 
mean firm passed up tax benefits of $0.6 million to avoid a 2.3 percent reduction 
in reported earnings.  The few firms that did disqualify their incentive stock 
options were those with the strongest earnings, which may indicate that they were 
expecting a relatively small penalty for reporting lower earnings.   
 
•  Engel, Erickson, and Maydew (1999) analyze trust preferred stock, which is 
treated as equity for book purposes and debt for tax purposes.  They report that, of 
the 44 companies that used trust preferred stock to retire debt, 15 companies could 
have retired traditional preferred stock.  By choosing to retire debt (whose interest   9 
is deductible) rather than preferred stock (whose dividends are not deductible), 
these firms, on average, forwent tax benefits of $43 million to avoid increasing 
their debt-to-assets ratio by 12.8 percent.   
 
2.4.  Book-Tax Divergence 
Not all accounting and tax choices force trade-offs.  For some transactions, book 
income and taxable income do not move together.  When this happens, accounting profits 
and taxable income diverge.  As noted above, book depreciation is based on an 
assessment of the deterioration of property, while tax depreciation is a statutorily 
determined amount that need not be related to the actual decline in the value of the 
property.  Thus, differences in GAAP and the tax law cause part of the book-tax 
divergence in depreciation.   
Some of the divergence between book and tax depreciation is at the discretion of 
the manager, because managers can choose among assorted methods of book 
depreciation.  Keating and Zimmerman (2000) provide evidence consistent with 
managers considering the divergence in book and tax when they make their book 
depreciation choice.  They find that the book life of depreciable assets moves with the 
statutory lives for tax depreciation purposes, although there is no GAAP or legal 
requirement for them to do so.   
That managers would consider book-tax divergence when they make decisions is 
consistent with recent studies that document that book-tax divergence can be costly—
both increasing tax payments and financial reporting costs.
9  Mills (1998) provides an 
example of increased tax costs arising from book-tax divergence.  She uses confidential 
IRS data to demonstrate that firms with larger differences in book earnings and taxable 
income are more likely to be audited. 
Hanlon (2005) provides an example of increased financial reporting costs arising 
from book-tax divergence.  Using financial statement disclosures, she finds that the more 
book income and taxable income diverge, the more investors trade as though they 
consider the book earnings to be of lower “quality” (i.e., unlikely to persist). 
                                                 
9 For a sampling of recent studies of book-tax differences, see Plesko (1999), Mills and Newberry (2001), 
Gleason and Mills (2002), Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2002), Desai (2003), Schrand and Wong 2003; Frank 
and Rego (2003), Lev and Nissim (2004), Hanlon, Maydew and Shevlin (2006) and Schmidt (2006), 
among many others.   10 
To summarize, differences in book income and taxable income can arise both 
from mandated differences in GAAP and the tax law and from discretionary financial 
accounting and tax choices.  These divergences between book and tax are not neutral.  
They increase both tax and financial reporting costs and may serve as prima facie 
evidence that either the tax liability is understated or the reported book earnings are 
overstated.   
 
2.5.  Conformity 
In recent years, the divergence between book income and taxable income has led 
to calls from some policy makers and scholars to force firms to report (more) transactions 
identically for book and tax purposes.
10  From its inception, the corporate tax law has 
been built on the financial accounting system.  In the absence of specific exceptions in 
the tax law, transactions continue to be treated the same for book and tax.  However, over 
time, Congress has passed many provisions that specify a different treatment for tax than 
for GAAP.  These tax-only provisions increase divergence between book accounting and 
tax accounting.
11   
Proponents of increased book-tax conformity (legislated, rather than the default 
form of conformity that now exists) argue that permitting or requiring firms to account 
for transactions one way for their shareholders and another way for the IRS produces 
misleading reports for both audiences, e.g., overstated accounting earnings and 
understated taxable income.  Those who oppose conformity argue that the audiences 
should receive different information because the purposes and uses of financial reports 
and tax returns differ.   
                                                 
10 See Hanlon and Shevlin (2005) and Hanlon and Maydew (2006) for a detailed analysis of the benefits 
and costs associated with book-tax conformity. 
11 One notable exception is LIFO, a method of computing inventory costs where Congress requires book-
tax conformity, i.e., a firm using LIFO for tax purposes also must use it for book purposes.  As background, 
both tax law and GAAP permits firms to compute the costs of their inventory without regard to the actual 
flows of inputs.  During inflationary periods, if recently acquired, high-cost inputs are assumed to be the 
ones that complete the production process first (“last-in, first-out”, or LIFO), then the cost of inventory that 
is deducted on the tax return will be higher than if lower cost inputs are assumed to have completed the 
production process first.  Because of the LIFO conformity rule, net income will also be lower.  Thus, firms 
that wish to use LIFO for tax purposes must trade-off the tax advantages with any financial reporting costs 
associated with lower profits.   11 
While this paper takes no position on legislated book-tax conformity, it is relevant 
here because it would increase the number of situations in which firms would have to 
trade off book and tax incentives.  The trade-off literature suggests that, in some 
situations, firms would take positions to enhance their book earnings (and thus arguably 
provide misleading tax reports) and at other times, they would take positions to reduce 
their tax liabilities (and thus arguably produce misleading financial reports).
12  Either 
way, more book-tax conformity would increase the need for managers to coordinate their 
book and tax choices while reducing the current financial accounting and tax costs 
associated with book-tax divergence. 
   
3.  Model 
3.1.  The Basic Setup 
The theoretical and empirical research cited above highlights several things that a 
comprehensive model must address.  First, a model should allow for the possibility that 
firms value book income as well as after-tax real income.  It should also allow for the 
possibility that, at the margin, firms care about book income in one period more than in 
another.  Second, book income and taxable income are not necessarily equal.  They may 
differ because accounting conventions require one treatment of an action but the tax 
system requires something different.  Differences may also arise because tax or 
accounting rules give a firm discretion, so that differences are the result of strategic 
choices.  Third, when book income and taxable income diverge, it may be costly to the 
firm.  Finally, a comprehensive model should be able to address the consequences of 
required conformity between the tax system and accounting standards.  In this section, we 
incrementally develop a model that has these features. 
Although in the previous section we emphasized the role of information, we will 
not  formally  model  asymmetric  information.    We  do  not  formally  model  the  role  of 
information because it is difficult and necessitates a narrow focus on one or a small set of 
agency  problems.    Instead,  we  employ  a  reduced-form  model  that  allows  for  the 
uncontroversial possibility that in equilibrium the decision makers (henceforth managers) 
employed at public companies care about book earnings, conditional on the underlying 
                                                 
12 See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for examples.   12 
“real” profitability (cash flows) of the corporation’s operations.  This is a natural result of 
there being some information that is private to managers that makes it (privately, not 
necessarily socially) optimal for the manager’s compensation to be based on earnings 
reports.
13  When executive compensation is set so that the incentives of the manager and 
the shareholders are optimally aligned, then the manager’s maximizing this function will 
also be in the shareholders’ interest.  In this case, the ability to move book income may 
allow a manager to signal private information, as discussed in Sankar and Subramanyam 
(2001).  Even in the absence of asymmetric information between owners and managers, 
the ability to shift book income may be valuable because contracts and debt covenants 
may (optimally) be written in terms of financial variables. Note, though, as Crocker and 
Slemrod  (forthcoming)  show,  although  an  optimal  compensation  scheme  should  be 
designed with an eye on deterring misleading reporting by the firm’s officers, it should 
not eliminate earnings manipulation, because doing so would excessively constrain the 
ability of the shareholders to incentivize the manager to take the appropriate actions that 
maximize profits.  In the model we develop below, managers have some ability to shift 
book income across periods, but cannot appropriate funds from the corporation. 
One implication of this is that the tradeoff between cash flows and book income 
will vary across types of corporations and within corporations across periods.  For 
example, Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1998) find that as a firm’s financial health 
decreases, its accounting earnings becomes less important in the valuation of the firm 
while its book value (which better measures the firm’s cash liquidation value) becomes 
more important.  Conversely, accounting earnings are more useful than cash measures in 
assessing the rents associated with future growth opportunities and other unrecognized 
assets.     
The reduced-form approach hampers normative analysis of tax and accounting 
policy because it does not explicitly account for the extent to which managerial 
incentives are aligned with shareholders’ incentives nor does it address the social benefits 
of access to information and how they might change when policy changes; it is a positive 
analysis of the impact of tax policy on corporate behavior.  The reduced-form approach is 
also likely to be misleading about the impact on corporate decisions of certain non-
                                                 
13 Of course compensation contracts may also be contingent on the company’s share price.   13 
incremental policy changes.  For example, if a the penalty for accounting fraud or tax 
noncompliance was shifted from the corporation to the manager, this would affect the 
structure of the optimal compensation contract, which in turn would affect the objective 
function of the decision maker; the analysis that follows applies to policy changes that 
leave the objective function unchanged.  . 
The model also assumes perfect certainty although, in reality, uncertainty abounds 
and firms make real and accounting decisions based on their beliefs about the future.  In 
an uncertain world, a firm might expend resources to achieve discretion in its reporting 
that has expected value but ultimately provides no benefit to the firm.  For example, a 
firm may suspect that its marginal tax rate next period will be lower than it is today, 
perhaps because it expects a net operating loss in the next period.  As a result, it may 
choose one investment project over another because the former produces slack in the 
timing of tax income and the firm would like to shift taxable income forward.  Next 
period earnings, however, may be unexpectedly strong, so that the marginal tax rate is 
unchanged.  In such a case, slack was created, perhaps at a cost, but ex post, it produced 
no benefits for the firm.  Although we could recast our two-period model of certainty to 
allow uncertainty about future cash flows and future tax policy, we believe that this 
would introduce more notational complexity than is justified by the additional insights.  
Nevertheless, we believe it is appropriate to think about our results as pertaining to a 
world of probabilistic decision-making. 
With these qualifications, we assert that a company makes decisions in order to 
maximize an objective function that includes both the present value of after-tax cash 
flows and the financial accounting expression of those cash flows as after-tax book 
earnings (income) in each of two periods, referred to as period 1 and period 2.  A two-
period horizon is the minimal one that allows us to address shifting across time of taxable 
and book income.  
We write this objective function as follows:   
(1)  M ˜  C 
1 +δ ˜  C 
2, ˜  Y  B
1,δ ˜  Y  B
2 ( ), 
where  ˜  C 
i refers to after-tax cash flows in period i, δ is the economic discount factor on 
cash flows, and  ˜  Y  B
i refers to after-tax book profits in period i.  The relationship between 
cash flows and book income is worth noting: (a) total undiscounted cash flows equal total   14 
undiscounted book income over the two periods combined; (2) in any single period, book 
income equals cash flows plus accounting accruals.   
We assume that the function M is concave, differentiable, and use Mi  to denote 
the partial derivative of M(.) with respect to the ith argument of the function.  We use 
tildes to denote after-tax outcomes to eliminate the need for an additional subscript.  
Superscripts denote the period, while subscripts denote variables that are defined and 
measured by the tax system (T, for tax) or GAAP (B, for book), respectively.  
Parentheses denote functions, not multiplication. 
The standard economics modeling of real business decisions would include only 
the first argument of this function, ignoring the possibility that firms might value 
accounting earnings.  Our setup allows the firm to trade off book income and cash flows.  
Indeed, M2/M1 represents the “exchange rate”, or tradeoff, between the current period’s 
financial reporting considerations (in this case, book income) and cash flow that so many 
accounting studies, briefly described in Section 2, have addressed.  Assuming that the 
book income implications must eventually reverse, it is probably best to think of, for 
example, the tradeoff of 0.11 (i.e., 11 cents of tax for one dollar of earnings), estimated 
by Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2004), as reflecting (M2 - δM3)/M1.
14   
The framework also accommodates the possibility that firms value an additional 
dollar of (discounted) book income in one period more than in another.  This may be the 
case, for example, if a manager seeks to smooth earnings, create an upward trend in 
earnings, maximize compensation that is determined on a period-specific basis, such as 
bonuses (see Healy, 1985) or meet some other earnings target.  We include the discount 
factor,δ, as a multiplicative factor on the second-period book income simply as a 
notational matter to provide symmetry with the discounting of cash flows.  It implies that 
if M2 (the marginal value of first-period book income) were to equal M3 (the marginal 
value of second-period income), then the company would be indifferent at the margin 
between first-period book income and the discounted present value of second-period 
book income; however, the objective function is flexible enough so that, when M2 does 
                                                 
14 In Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2004), 0.11 is the ratio of total cash flow costs to total book income 
increases, while (M2 - δM3)/M1 is a ratio of marginal values.   15 
not equal M3, this need not be true.  Indeed, when M2 = δM3, the company is indifferent, 
at the margin, between undiscounted book earnings in the two periods. 
Central to our model is how the tax code and GAAP transform cash flows into 
measures of taxable income and book earnings, respectively.  To accommodate the fact 
that neither the tax system nor GAAP treats all types of cash flows equivalently, we 
explicitly distinguish a variety of cash flow categories (j=1,...,J) that may be treated 
differently by either the tax code or GAAP.  Equation 2 expresses the total after-tax cash 
flow in a period as the sum of pre-tax cash flows over these J categories minus taxes paid 
(T
i). 
(2)  ˜  C 




i     for i =1,2 
Equation 3 defines taxes paid in a period as a function of taxable income in that 
period, such that T
i(.) is the tax code schedule that relates tax liability to taxable income.  






i ( )     for i =1,2 
Equation 4 defines taxable income, which depends on the categories of cash flows 
in both periods.  We write this function in a very general way to allow for the possibility 
that two streams of cash, even if they are identical in every period, may have different 
implications for taxable income.  The notation C
i represents the vector of cash flow 
categories in period i. 
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Equation 5 is straightforward: after-tax book income  ˜  Y  B
i ( ) is the pretax book 
income from a period  YB
i ( ) minus the book tax provision TB
i ( ).   
(5)  ˜  Y  B
i =YB
i −TB
i     for i =1,2 
The “book tax provision” is the expense for income taxes that is recorded in 
financial statements.  It is the past, present and estimated future taxes triggered by 
economic activity in the period.  Thus, equation 6 defines a single period’s book tax 
                                                 
15 This assumption prevents us from directly addressing the implications of limited tax loss refundability, 
loss carryforward and carryback rules.  This could be easily introduced, though at the cost of further 
notational complexity.   16 
provision as a function of taxes paid to the IRS in both periods.  Over the life of the firm 
(two periods in this model), the sum of the book tax provisions equals the sum of taxes 
paid.  Since the sum of pre-tax book income equals the sum of pre-tax cash flows, then 
the sum of after-tax book income equals the sum of after-tax cash flows.





2 ( )     for i =1,2 
Equation 7 defines book income.  As with income for tax purposes, book income 
depends in a general way on the cash flows, depending on the category of cash flow.  
Critically, the function that maps cash flows into book income is distinct both from the 
YT
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2)     for i =1,2 
 
3.2.  Discretion and shifting 
  We next introduce the concept of discretion.  In our model, a firm has discretion 
to the extent that it is able to shift pre-tax book income, taxable income, or the book tax 
provision across time.
17  The amounts shifted are introduced as choice variables, ST 
andSB, which denote income shifting for tax and book purposes, respectively, and PB, 
which denotes the shifting of the book tax provision.  
  These choice variables are subject to a constraint.  For any given set of real 
decisions made by the firm there is a limited amount of discretion in book income, 
taxable income, and the book tax provision.  Given the maximum available slack, the 
                                                 
16 Here is a simple numerical example of accounting for income taxes.  Suppose (a) income (for both book 
and tax purposes) is $10 before considering depreciation; (b) book depreciation is $5 in both the first and 
second period; (c) tax depreciation is $10 in the first period and zero in the second period (i.e., immediate 
expensing); and (d) the tax rate is 40 percent.  The book tax provision in both periods is $2 [(10-5)(0.4)].  
Book net income, after depreciation and taxes, is $3 (10-5-2) in both periods.  Zero (4) actual taxes are paid 
in the first (second) year.  In the balance sheet at the end of the first year, the firm records a deferred (i.e., 
future) tax liability of $2, representing the $2 of tax to be paid in the second period.  At the end of the 
second period, the liability of $2 is removed from the balance sheet, recognizing the actual payment of 
those taxes.  Thus, although the expensing for tax purposes has the effect of accelerating cash flows, it has 
no effect on the accounting earnings.  The reason is that GAAP is designed to capture the taxes across all 
periods related to the economic activity in this period, regardless of when the actual taxes paid.  One way to 
think about this recording of book taxes is that the equipment produced $20 in revenue over two years.  
During thse two years, $4 of taxes were paid.  GAAP records those $4 of taxes over the equipment’s life, 
rather than in accordance with the actual timing of the tax payments to the government. 
17 Readers likely can readily identify examples of shifting pre-tax book or taxable income.  An example of 
shifting the book tax provision is the decision to report foreign earnings as permanently reinvested, a choice 
we detail in Section 4.2.      17 
firm chooses a level of shifting to maximize its objective function, M.  As defined, a 
positive ST defers taxable income, and therefore tax payments, to the second period and 
so moves after-tax cash flows up to the first period.  Similarly, a positive value of  SB  
moves book income to the second period.  Every dollar of pre-tax book income shifted 
requires that τ dollars of book tax provision be booked in the second period, where τ is 
the statutory tax rate on corporate income.  A positive value of PB denotes shifting of the 
book tax provision to the second period, and thus reduces after-tax book income in the 
second period.  By definition, shifting allows the firm to move recognition  across 
periods, but it does not change the undiscounted total of taxable income, book income, or 
the book tax provision.  
The key to our model is that we will allow each type of discretion to be a function 
of the firm's real actions.  If a firm undertakes a set of activities, these activities will 
generate some level of discretion.  Given this discretion, the firm will choose the optimal 
amount of shifting.  The interaction between “normal” business operations and shifting 
comes from the fact that firms recognize the value of discretion, and, therefore, ceteris 
paribus, prefer actions that create discretion.  The model makes a sharp distinction 
between discretionary and non-discretionary choices.  This distinction is meant to 
indicate that there is a class of choices that are well understood and signal nothing about 
either tax or book aggressiveness.  In practice, however, the distinction between 
discretionary and non-discretionary choices is less clear to the users of financial 
statements, the IRS, and researchers.  Although by assumption income shifting pertains to 
temporary, rather than permanent, differences between book and tax accounting, our 
formulation of the YB and YT functions is general enough to allow permanent differences 
between book and tax, so that the book “effective tax rate,” defined as the ratio of the 
(total) book tax provision to book pre-tax earnings, need not equal the statutory tax rate.  
We introduce one final wrinkle.  As detailed above, in some circumstances both 
the capital markets and the IRS may believe that book-tax differences signal potential 
manipulation of financial information.  Thus, it may be costly for firms when 
discretionary shifts of taxable (ST) and book income (SB) diverge.  To capture this notion, 
we define the function Ω: 
(8)  Ω = Ω SB − ST ( ),   18 
where  ( ) 0 Ω  = 0.  To incorporate any costs associated with book-tax differences, we 
subtract the cost from first-period book income and first-period cash flow (and assume it 
is subtracted in the calculation of taxable income). 
When we add the notion of discretion, the capacity to shift, and the cost of 
divergence, the equations defining after-tax cash flows and book income become 
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˜  C 
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The fact that the firm is constrained in its ability to shift taxable income and book 
income is represented by the expressions ST , SB  and PB , which are the maximum 
amount of shifting that the firm is able to perform under the tax code and GAAP.
 18  The 
model accommodates the idea that discretion may or may not be valuable to a firm, 
depending on their situation.  As we elaborate on below, if an action creates additional 
discretion, this is only valuable if that discretion is to be used.  Mathematically, discretion 
has marginal value if and only if the shifting constraints are binding.
19  
These constraints are written as: 
(12)  ST ≤ ST  
(13)  SB ≤ SB 
(14)  B P PB ≤  
 
                                                 
18 Implicitly, shifting that exceeds this limit is subject to unacceptably high IRS penalties or SEC sanctions.  
Note that, as an alternative to introducing caps, we could have posited a "cost of shifting function" that 
allows the firm to shift any amount while incurring a convex cost. The cost function could also take D as an 
argument, allowing real decisions to shift the cost schedule.  This is a common approach in the analysis of 
tax avoidance and income shifting.  See Slemrod (2001) for an example in economics and Stocken and 
Verrecchia (2004) for an example in accounting.  
19 In the first-order conditions discussed later, this will be synonymous with a non-zero Lagrange 
multiplier.   19 
3.3.  Book-tax conformity 
Our model can address any form of book-tax conformity.  As discussed above, 
many transactions are treated the same for book and tax purposes.  If GAAP and tax 
treatment were always the same, i.e., complete book-tax conformity, then taxable income 
would equal pre-tax book income, and in terms of our notation, YB would equal YT  in 
both periods.  However, not all transactions are treated differently for book and tax.  
Thus, current practice is characterized by “partial conformity.”  Our notation easily 
accommodates the notion of partial conformity by requiring some subset of the cash flow 
categories to have identical effects on taxable income and book income. 
We introduce an additional element of conformity to our analysis of discretion by 
allowing that there may be a constraint requiring ST to equal SB.
20  In equation (16), the 
term A is a zero-one dummy variable indicating whether or not tax and book transfers 
must conform.
21  If the government requires conformity, then A=1, and the transfer of 
book income must match the transfer of tax income.  If the government does not require 
conformity, then A=0, and the tax shifting may differ from the book shifting.  Conformity 
generates interaction by linking the values of book and tax discretion.  For example, 
additional discretion in book income might be valuable even if a firm is indifferent to the 
timing of book earnings, because it allows the transfer of taxable income across periods.  
Formally, we write the conformity constraint as follows: 
(15)  A SB − ST [ ]= 0. 
 
3.4.  Optimal Real Decisions 
3.4.1.  Without accounting considerations—the standard economics 
approach 
 
To analyze the interaction between real and accounting considerations, we next 
introduce a continuous real decision, D, made by the firm in the first period.  This 
decision could be the purchase of a capital good, a decision to undertake research and 
                                                 
20 Note that imposing this constraint is equivalent to specifying that Ω goes to infinity whenever ST and SB 
diverge. 
21 Technically, the A variable concerns what one might call “marginal conformity,” i.e., whether shifts from 
baseline “unmanipulable” measures of book and tax income must be equal.  This is a different concept than 
“partial conformity,” which refers to the fact that some aspects of accountings are the same for tax and 
book purposes, and some are not.   20 
development, where to locate a plant, how to finance capital, or any number of decisions 
that a firm must make.  This decision will determine the firm's cash flows and the 
discretion available to the firm.  In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate how 
accounting considerations influence the optimal choice of D, given that D may affect the 
amount of discretion available to the firm. 
In the interest of building intuition, rather than immediately analyzing the general 
case, we begin by describing the optimal choice of D when there are no financial 
accounting considerations and no shifting choices.  In this case, D determines cash flows 
and, in turn, determines tax obligations. 
To characterize the effects of taxes on real and accounting decisions, we derive 
the first-order conditions that characterize an optimal choice.  By examining first-order 
conditions we are assuming that each real decision (and, below, the shifting decisions) is 
a continuous variable.  We presume that the optimal decision is an interior solution (i.e., 
it is non-zero), and so the firm should pursue this activity until its marginal contribution 
to firm value, M, is zero.  If D were a lumpy, rather than a continuous, decision, the first-
order (equality) conditions that follow can be thought of as inequalities that dictate the 
optimal yes-or-no decision: if and only if the left-hand side (the decision’s contribution to 
M) exceeds zero should the firm “do” D. 
   If neither book income, discretion, nor conformity is of concern, then the first-
order condition simplifies to something familiar to economists: D should be set so that at 




















































For functions with a single argument, a prime indicates the first derivative of that 
function with respect to its argument, so thatT
i′ is the marginal tax rate in period i, 
defined as the change in tax liability due to a marginal change in taxable income.  The 
first two summations are just the marginal change in the pre-tax cash flows, summed over 
all categories, in each period.  The value of these cash flows is eroded by the additional 
tax obligations that they trigger, i.e., the marginal increase in total discounted present   21 
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  to 
determine the change in tax obligation.  Note that, because the model is based on a set of 
cash flow categories, this framework allows that the tax obligations triggered by two 
actions that generate the same total pre-tax cash flow in each period need not be the 
same.  
3.4.2.   
3.4.2.  When book income matters 
When managers care about book income as well as real cash flows, the marginal 
value of any decision depends not only on how it affects after-tax cash flows, but also on 
how it affects book income in both periods.  It becomes possible that a corporation will 
want to undertake a marginal real activity even if it reduces the present value of after-tax 
cash flows.  To pursue this idea, we introduce the concept of a "marginal value" (MV) to 
capture this value in a parsimonious way, and so define the following expressions:. 
(17) 
MVC j








































Each MV term takes into account the marginal value to the firm of both the cash flows 
and book income in each period, through the Mi terms.  Recall that  M1,M2 and  M3 are 
the derivatives of the objective function M(.) with respect to, respectively, each of its 
three arguments (the present-value of real after-tax cash flows, period 1 after-tax book 
income, and (discounted) period 2 after-tax book income).
22  For example, the MV of an 
                                                 
22 Note that  M1,M2 and  M3 are functions, not scalars. The marginal value of each of the three arguments 
of the M(.) function may depend on the level of the other arguments.   22 
increase in cash flow from category j in period 1 is the value of the cash flow (M1), plus 
the marginal increase in period 1 book income multiplied by the marginal value of period 
1 book income (M2), plus the analogous (discounted) term for period 2 book income. 
When the firm is concerned with book income as well as real cash flows, the first-
order condition for the optimal D will reflect that a marginal change in D adds (or 
subtracts) value through its effect on after-tax book income.  Using the MV notation, we 













































This optimality condition generalizes the standard case shown in equation (16) 
because it recognizes that changes in book income affect the firm’s objective to the extent 
that book income has marginal value in each period.  If, for example, book income has a 
higher value in period 1 than in period 2, then M2 exceeds δM3 and the effect of D on the 
timing of book income affects the attractiveness of D.  
As in the standard case, the value of additional cash is eroded by the tax system.  
Tax obligations are increased by the marginal tax rate multiplied by the marginal increase 








.  The marginal cost to the 
firm of an increase in tax obligations is the MV of taxes in that period, which includes 
both the marginal value of real discounted cash flow (M1) and the marginal value of book 
income multiplied by the reduction in book income resulting from the change in the tax 
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   .   
The expanded optimality condition highlights the mechanics of the tax system.  
As in the standard case, a choice D that generates cash flow is less valuable if it also 
triggers a required payment to the IRS.  The expanded optimality condition demonstrates 
that the total cost to the firm of paying the IRS is not just the amount of the check.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
   23 
increased payment to the IRS must be accounted for in the firm's financial statements.  
This implies that book income will be lowered, and the value of this to the firm will 
depend on when the tax must be booked and the marginal value of book income in that 
period.   
 
3.4.3.  Discretion and shifting 
Unlike in the standard economics model, the choice of D may affect the 
constraints ST , SB , and  B P , which determine how much shifting the firm is able to 
accomplish.  By assumption, shifting incurs no cost up to the constraint, and is 
impossible beyond the constraint.  If a firm wants to shift more than the constraint, it 
must undertake other activities (D) that produce additional slack.  As a result, real 
decisions may add value (i.e., increase M) by expanding the scope of discretion.
23  Thus, 
the model highlights the link between real activities and tax and book manipulation 
because, to the extent that shifting has value, it may affect the real decision D.   
The assumption that shifting is free up to a point, given the actions D, and 
impossible beyond that is consistent with a firm choice that creates a tax obligation that 
must be met at some point, and firms may move that obligation backwards or forwards, 
but they can do this only up to some amount.  If a firm values discretion at the margin, 
then the optimal amount of a decision D that raises discretion will be higher than it would 
be absent concerns about timing and discretion.  Equivalently, we can say that the cost of 
capital for capital goods that produce (valuable) discretion is lower than it is for capital 
goods with the same cash-flow implications that do not create discretion.   
Formally, the first-order condition for D becomes: 
                                                 
23 Recall that our reduced-form version of the manager’s objective function rules out the possibility that 
expanding discretion may itself  affect the objective function of managers by, for example, reducing the 
relative value of book income versus cash flows because the market becomes more suspicious of the 
information content of earnings figures.  Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) and Stocken and Verrechia (2004) 



















































B P will be non-zero and will affect the real decision as long as the associated λ value 
is non-zero.  Formally, the λ terms are the Lagrange multipliers on the shifting 
constraints in the constrained maximization problem the company solves.  Informally, 
λT, λB, and  P λ  are equal to how much more M could be achieved if the taxable income, 
book income, and book tax provision shifting constraints, respectively, were to be relaxed 
by one dollar.  Henceforth we will refer to the λ terms as the “value” of relaxing the 
shifting constraints.   
If a shifting constraint is not binding, so that the firm is not shifting all that it 
could, then the relevant λ term is zero: the constraint imposes no cost on the firm, and 
thus relaxing the constraint has no value.  When it is binding, λ is positive and equal to 
the value of moving income between periods.  Thus, for example, the term  ′
B BS λ  is zero 
when the constraint on the shifting of income for book purposes is not binding, but when 
it is binding, it is equal to the value of relaxing the constraint by one dollar, which is 
equivalent to the value of moving book income between periods, multiplied by how much 
the real decision relaxes the constraint.  In the next section, we expand on what 
determines the values of the λ terms when we focus on the shifting and conformity 
constraints as well as the cost of divergence. 
 
3.4.4.  Conformity 
It is worth noting that the first-order condition for optimal D contains no term that 
directly relates to a conformity requirement  because D does not relax (or tighten) the 
conformity requirement the way we allow it to relax or tighten the shifting constraints.  
This does not, however, imply that conformity has no effect on real decisions; indeed, the   25 
opposite is true.  Imposing conformity can change the real decision calculus by changing 
the value of discretion, which is captured by theλT, λB, and  P λ  terms.   
Consider, as an example, a real decision that relaxes the constraint on book 
income shifting.  If the constraint is otherwise binding, this makes the real decision more 
attractive than otherwise.  Now impose conformity, and assume that the optimal response 
to conformity is for the firm to reduce how much taxable income it shifts to the second 
period and reduce how much book income it shifts to the first period.  Moreover, suppose 
that the fall in book income shifting implies that the book income shifting constraint is no 
longer binding.  Under conformity, the fact that the real decision relaxes the book income 
shifting constraint has no value ( B λ  falls from a positive number to zero), and the real 
decision is less attractive than it was in the absence of conformity.   
 
3.5.  Optimal shifting, with real consequences 
Not only do accounting considerations affect real decisions, but real decisions 
also affect shifting decisions.  Indeed, in our model the two sets of decisions are 
simultaneously determined.  We now examine the shifting decisions. 
 
3.5.1  Taxable income shifting 
Consider first the shifting of taxable income.  The first-order condition that 





2′ + M1 + M2 − MVT
1 [ ] T
1′  
   
 
    ′  Ω − λT −µA = 0 
where recall that λT  is the marginal value of the taxable income shifting constraint.  
Equation (20) introduces a new term, denoted µ, which is equal to the marginal value of 
the conformity constraint: how much greater M could be if taxable income and book 
income shifting could diverge by one dollar.
24   
It is helpful to consider some special cases.  First, assume that there are no 
divergence costs ( ′  Ω =0),λT is zero, and conformity is not relevant (µA=0).  In this case 




2′, which implies that the (cash 
                                                 
24 Formally, µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the conformity condition.   26 
flow and book income) implications of reporting an additional dollar of taxable income in 
each period must be equal; if they are not, then taxable income should be shifted.  This 
equality may not hold because a firm faces a different marginal tax rate in the two periods 
( ′ ≠ ′ 2 1 T T ),.
25  However, note that taxable income shifting can be valuable even if the 
marginal tax rates are equal in both periods, if the (cash flow and book income) value of a 
dollar of tax payments is not equal in the two periods  MVT
1 [ ]≠ MVT
2 [ ] ( ).  





2′ = λT, which means that the (book-income-adjusted) tax arbitrage 
is incomplete.  Because of the constraint on shifting, there may be a gain from having 
taxable income in one period that the firm cannot take advantage of.  This reminds us that 
λT  is the value of being able to shift an additional dollar of taxable income between 
periods (or, equivalently, of the marginal cost of not being able to shift).  
Finally, the relationship between the optimal SB and the firm's choice of ST is 
implicit in this optimality condition.  The two types of shifting interact through the µ and 
Ω terms.  When A=1 (conformity is required), µ will be non-zero, but Ω will be zero, 
because the book income shifted equals the taxable income shifted. 
When  ′  Ω ≠0, then the effect of taxable income shifting on the cost of divergence 
matters.  A marginal increase in ST may cause Ω to rise or fall, depending on whether or 
not ST is smaller than or larger than SB, before the increase in ST.  An increase in the cost 
of divergence lowers total cash flow and period one book income.  It also lowers taxes 
paid because this cost is, by assumption, tax deductible.
26 
                                                 
25 Although not explicitly in this model, in reality this could occur because of the limited refundability of 
net operating losses.  The present value of the additional tax liability caused by an additional dollar of 
taxable income is the concept that, e.g. Graham and Mills (2006) and others have tried to measure 
quantitatively using data from financial statements and corporate tax returns, usually referred to as the 
marginal tax rate.  This is quite different than what tax economists call the marginal effective tax rate on an 
incremental dollar of investment, which is the accrual-equivalent tax rate triggered on the returns to a 
marginal investment, which depends not only on the statutory tax rate but also the pattern of depreciation 
allowances.  Fullerton (1984) provides a helpful discussion of this concept.  Although economists often 
ignore this in their calculations (although see, e.g., Auerbach (1986)), in principle the marginal effective tax 
rate should depend on the details of limited loss refundability that are central to the marginal tax rate 
calculations done by accounting and finance scholars (e.g., Scholes, and Wolfson (1992) and Graham 
(1996).   
26 Almost all divergence costs are deductible, e.g., legal fees and increased borrowing costs.  One 
divergence cost that is not deductible is additional Federal taxes that could arise from an IRS audit.   27 
In either case, whether  ′  Ω ≠0 or  0 ≠ A µ , the optimal ST will be linked to the 
firm's choice of SB.  The tension created will prevent the (book-income-adjusted) tax 
arbitrage from being executed fully.  For example, suppose that the firm would like to 
move a large amount of book income to the first period, but would like to defer taxable 
income to the second period.  In such a case, the firm may choose to set  ST lower than is 
optimal from the point of view of reducing total discounted taxes paid, because doing so 
allows the movement of more book income to the first period.  This is one example of 
how tax minimization is not generally an optimal strategy.   
 
3.5.2.  Book income shifting 
The first-order condition with respect to book income shifting is 
(21)  [ ] [ ] [ ] 0 MV 1 1
1 1
2 1 3 2 = + − Ω′  

 
 ′ − + − − + − − A T T M M M M B µ λ τ δ τ  
Firms may wish to move book income because they value discounted book income in one 
period more than in another, in which case  3 2 M M δ − ≠ 0.  If  ′  Ω = λB =µ =0, then book 
income is shifted until the marginal value of discounted after-tax book income is equal 
across periods.  If M2=M3, the only motivation for shifting book income is that firms 
would prefer to report earnings sooner, due to discounting.  Note also that moving one 
dollar of book income across periods moves only 1 - τ dollars of after-tax book income.  
If the constraint on book shifting is binding, then λB is positive and the marginal 
contribution to M of shifting through its effect on book incomes,  3 2 ( M M δ − − )(1 – τ), 
will be greater than zero by λB; the constraint limits the amount that the firm wants to 
shift. 
There are several similarities between the optimality conditions for SB and ST.  
The terms related to µ and Ω are exactly the same, with a change in sign, between the 
equations.  This is because, at any given point, an increase in SB must have exactly the 
opposite effect of an increase in ST on the cost of divergence. 
Note also that, when µ ≠ 0, and marginal conformity is imposed, either λT or λB 
must be equal to zero.  This is because, when the two shifted amounts are forced to be the 
same, only one of them can be binding.  Thus, of the three values, λT, λB, and µ, one of 
them is always zero.   28 
There are two reasons that the choice of ST and SB are not independent: conformity 
and the cost of divergence.  If conformity is an issue (A=1), then shifting of either taxable 
(book) income may become more or less attractive, depending on whether it aids or 
hinders book (taxable) income.  Whenever ST and SB would not be equal in the absence of 
conformity, the conformity condition binds, and the value of µ is non-zero.  When neither 
shifting constraint is binding, conformity means that at least one type of shifting will 
have to change; if both change, they will change in opposite directions.  This is reflected 
by the fact that the µA terms enter the first-order condition for ST and SB with opposite 
sign.  If conformity puts upward pressure on ST, then adding the µA term means that the 
marginal contribution to the discounted value of cash flow will just equal minus one 
times the value of the conformity constraint, so that the marginal tax saving is actually 
negative.   
Conversely, if conformity puts downward pressure on book income shifting, the 
marginal contribution to the value of book income will be equal to the (positive) value of 
the conformity constraint, so that at the margin there would be additional value from 
booking income, if not for the conformity constraint.  If both the shifting and conformity 
constraints are binding, (so that absent any constraints ST and SB would be different and at 
least one would exceed the shifting limit), both the µ and (at least one) λ terms are 
relevant.   
If divergence between tax and book income is costly ( ′  Ω ≠0), then optimal 
shifting of both tax and book must account for the fact that shifting book or tax items 
without shifting the other item will affect the amount of book-tax differences and change 
the cost of such divergence.  Note that the two bracketed terms that involve Ω appear in 
an equal, but differently signed, way in the two first-order conditions.  That reflects the 
fact that if increasing ST has a marginal divergence cost, then decreasing SB must have the 
same marginal cost.  
 
3.5.3.  Shifting the book tax provision 
The firm's optimization problem involves one final choice, the shifting of the 
book tax provision, PB.  The first-order condition for this choice is very simple: 
(22)  0 3 2 = − − P M M λ δ    29 
When a firm increases PB (i.e., moves a dollar of book tax provision to the second 
period), it directly transfers one dollar of after-tax, book income from the second period 
to the first period.  The firm will shift the provision in this manner until after-tax book 
income is equally valuable across periods, unless it is constrained in the amount of 
available discretion. 
Note that this choice will interact with the other shifting decisions.  If a firm has 
considerable discretion in timing the book tax provision, it may use this discretion to 
equalize the value of after-tax, book income over time.  This lowers the value of shifting 
pre-tax book income. 
When conformity between ST and SB is binding (or divergence is very costly), 
shifting of the book tax provision may enable the firm to circumvent the conformity 
constraint.  Consider a firm that would like to move taxable income into the second 
period, but places a high marginal value on after-tax book income in the current period.  
Under conformity, the firm cannot use its discretion to do both.  If this firm has 
considerable discretion in the timing of its book tax provision, however, it could move 
taxable income into the second period, along with a matching amount of book income, 
and then offset the loss of pre-tax book income in the first period by reducing PB in the 
first period.   
Note that the substitutability of shifting book income and changing the timing of 
the book tax provision assumes that the benefits to managing after-tax earnings, using the 
book tax provision, are the same as shifting (an after-tax equivalent amount of) pre-tax 
earnings.  The findings in Robinson (2006) challenge this assumption.  In her study of 
investments in housing tax credits, she finds that firms value pre-tax earnings more than 
reductions in the book tax provision.  If her findings generalize, then firms may have to 
shift larger amounts of book tax provision to reduce financial reporting costs the same as 
with a smaller portion of book income shifting.  Her findings are consistent with analysts 
and others using operating earnings, EBITDA, or similar measures that ignore the book 
tax provision to value a firm. 
 
3.6.  Summary   30 
The formal analysis of this model suggests that the attractiveness of a real 
decision depends on both its effect on discounted after-tax cash flow and its effect on 
book income.  A key result is that the attractiveness of a real decision depends on 
whether it expands the discretion of both book and tax accounting.  If the real decisions 
of the firm affect the discretion the firm has in timing its taxable income, pre-tax book 
income, and book tax provision, then tax payments and book income may be moved to 
periods when it is of maximum value to the firm.  Discretion has value because if certain 
business operations induce a firm to show particularly high or low book income in a 
period, the firm may want to smooth its earnings through discretionary book accruals.  
Likewise, if normal business operations lead to different marginal tax rates, perhaps 
through net operating losses, then an ability to shift taxable income will become 
important.  However, real decisions that provide discretion lose value if the real decision 
leads to a costly divergence between pre-tax book income and taxable income. 
 
4.  Examples of the Value of Discretion 
  This section provides examples that illustrate how taxes affect real and accounting 
choices using the integrative framework detailed above.  In each case, we see the value 
created by a real decision that provides book and/or tax discretion.  We also see that firms 
that value discretion, at the margin, will have incentives to make real decisions that 
increase their flexibility in reporting for both book and tax purposes.  In the first example, 
incentives to increase book and tax discretion encourage firms to extend more credit than 
would otherwise be optimal.  In the second example, the decision to operate in a low-tax 
country provides book discretion.  In the third example, activities that result in uncertain 
tax positions (e.g., the transfer prices of intercompany sales) create book discretion.  The 
fourth example examines tax shelters, transactions that create unusually high levels of tax 
discretion.       
 
4.1  Incentives to Extend Credit 
The first example of the value of discretion involves incentives to extend credit.  
Consider a firm with $X in cash sales and $Y in credit sales.  Further assume that, after 
considering that some of the credit sales will not be collected, collection costs and the   31 
time value of money, the present value of the $Y of credit sales equals $X.  That is, the 
expected present value of the credit sales equals the value of the cash sales. 
If the firm would benefit from the ability to manage its earnings, then the 
discretion provided by the credit sales makes them more valuable to the firm than the 
cash sales.  The reason is that, at the time of the sale, the firm must estimate the 
uncollectible receivables and accrue (i.e., report as a current expense) the anticipated bad 
debts.  Because estimates are, by definition, imprecise, firms have some leeway in the 
amount that they record for bad debts.  If they wish to shift some income to (from) this 
year from (to) future years, they can lower (increase) the estimate of bad debts this year, 
within reason, and then record higher (lower) bad debt expenses in future years.  In terms 
of the model, the bad debt reserve for book purposes raises SB . 
Moreover, if the firm would benefit from the ability to manage its taxable income, 
then the discretion provided by the credit sales makes them more valuable for tax 
purposes to the firm than the cash sales.  The reason is that firms cannot deduct their bad 
debts at the time of the sale.  Instead, they must wait until a specific receivable is deemed 
worthless.  However, determining when a receivable becomes worthless is a judgment 
call.  This element of judgment provides the taxpayer with valuable discretion in the 
timing of the deduction, i.e., credit sales provide the firm some leeway in recording a tax 
deduction.  In terms of the model, investments that produce write-offs generate discretion 
in the timing of real taxes, increasing ST .  Because credit sales provide potentially 
important discretion in recording transactions for book and tax purposes, we would 
anticipate that some firms would advance credit at a lower cost than would be otherwise 
optimal. 
In addition to the usual incentive to accelerate deductions for tax purposes 
(represented by the δ term in the model), the tax discretion provided by credit sales may 
be valuable when net operating losses or credits are expiring.  In the model, loss or credit 
expiration is a reason why marginal tax rates may vary across periods (T0′ ≠T 1′).  To the 
extent that write-offs are associated with unprofitable ventures (e.g., a firm’s profitability 
is inversely correlated with bad debts), this discretion is ex ante particularly valuable, 
because it reduces the probability of being in a net operating loss position.  By timing the 
write-offs of receivables, the company may be able to maximize the tax savings from   32 
both operational losses and write-offs; they also gain discretion in the recognition of book 
income.  Because the timing for tax and book purposes must be the same, the value of 
discretion depends on the values of both shifting constraints, λBand λT.  The added 
discretion implies that high-risk ventures (e.g., banks lending to developing countries) are 
more attractive than otherwise for those companies for which either tax and/or book 
discretion has value.
27    
 
4.2  Incentives to invest abroad 
The next example of the value of discretion involves the incentive to invest 
outside the U.S.  Although foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies pay income tax in the 
jurisdictions where they operate, their parent companies generally do not pay any U.S. 
taxes on these foreign earnings until the profits are repatriated as dividends, at which time 
they pay the U.S. tax due net of any applicable foreign tax credit for taxes paid to the 
foreign government (sometimes called the “residual” U.S. tax).  If the profits are never 
repatriated, no U.S. taxes are ever paid.   
For book purposes, firms must record the profits of their foreign subsidiaries in 
the period when they are earned.
28  Managers, however, have a choice about when to 
record the book tax provision related to the U.S. tax triggered by repatriation.  One option 
is to estimate the eventual U.S. tax and expense those taxes when the foreign profits are 
booked.  By matching the tax provision to the foreign earnings, this option lowers current 
after-tax earnings, but leaves after-tax earnings unaffected when the dividend is paid.   
If the firm does not expect to repatriate the profits in the foreseeable future, there 
is a second option.  The firm can defer the expense until they decide to repatriate the 
funds.  If they never repatriate, then they never provide for the U.S. taxes.  This approach 
results in higher after-tax earnings in the year that the foreign profits are earned (because 
profits are not reduced by an estimate of the U.S. taxes at repatriation).  It also results in a 
                                                 
27 There may, of course, be general equilibrium price effects that dampen the effects we have been 
discussing.  For example, if the supply of these assets is not perfectly elastic, the increased demand for 
high-risk ventures may increase their relative price, dampening but not eliminating the enhanced 
attractiveness the book and tax discretion offers. 
28 An important distinction between book and tax is that the financial statements include the activities of all 
foreign subsidiaries, while the tax return generally excludes the profits of foreign subsidiaries.   33 
higher book tax provision (and lower after-tax book earnings) in the period when the firm 
decides to repatriate the foreign profits.   
Because a firm can change its intentions about paying a dividend at any time, it 
can shift book income over time.  Furthermore, a firm may decide that profits whose U.S. 
tax provision has already been booked will not be repatriated after all.  If so, the tax 
expense that was booked for the U.S. tax in the past is removed from the books, shifting 
book income into that year.  
This discretion in financial reporting provided by foreign operations means that 
firms have an incentive to locate in low-tax countries, e.g., tax havens.  The reason is that 
generally the less the foreign tax, the greater the U.S. tax, and thus the larger the book tax 
provision that can be shifted across periods.  Thus, GAAP encourages investment in tax 
havens.  In terms of the model, investing in tax havens raises SB(D). 
To summarize, the tax policy of deferring the U.S. tax liability on the earnings of 
foreign subsidiaries provides the parent company with potentially valuable discretion in 
financial reporting.  Because the U.S. tax payment is deferred until repatriation, firms can 
expense the tax when the profits are earned or whenever they decide that they will 
repatriate the funds.  This discretion provides an incentive to invest in low-tax countries.
 
The discretion would be eliminated if deferral of the residual U.S. tax was repealed or a 
territorial system was adopted.
29   
In 2004, the book discretion arising from the tax law came full circle.  The 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 provided a tax holiday to U.S. companies that 
repatriated earnings from their foreign subsidiaries.  The amount of foreign earnings that 
enjoyed a reduced tax rate was limited to the amount of “permanently reinvested foreign 
earnings,” an accounting term for the amount of profits in foreign subsidiaries for which 
the firm has not recorded a residual U.S. book tax provision 
30  In other words, the tax 
holiday was limited by the way that the managers booked the tax law’s deferral of U.S. 
taxes.   
                                                 
29 See Collins, Hand and Shackelford (2001) and Krull (2004) for details about permanently reinvested 
foreign earning.  Krull (2004) presents evidence of their use to manage earnings. 
30 “Permanently” does not mean “never;” rather, it means that the firm does not intend to pay the dividend 
in the “foreseeable” future.   34 
This example demonstrates the intersection and joint determination of a real 
decision (where to locate operations), a tax and financial decision (when to repatriate), 
and a book decision (when to record the book tax provision related to the repatriation).  
By investing abroad, the firm gains valuable tax and book discretion.  By timing the 
repatriation, the firm gains valuable tax and book discretion and manages its global cash 
balance.   
The model of Section 3 formalizes the idea that the incremental discretion in the 
timing of the book tax provision provides an incentive for some firms to invest in low-tax 
countries.  The lower the foreign tax rate, the larger the residual tax in the U.S. and 
consequently, the greater the earnings management potential.  This type of foreign 
investment, in addition to the contribution to real earnings, increases SB , which has 
expected value depending on the situation of the firm; equivalently, one can think of the 
increased book discretion as reducing the effective cost of capital for this type of 
investment. 
 
4.3  Uncertain tax positions, e.g., transfer pricing 
The third example of discretion involves uncertain tax positions that give rise to 
book discretion.  Although many transactions involve legal and factual ambiguity, we 
focus on intercompany transfer pricing within a multinational corporation.  As noted in 
the preceding section, financial statements are reported on a worldwide consolidated 
basis, but tax returns generally exclude profits earned through foreign subsidiaries.  Thus, 
multinationals can lower worldwide taxes by strategically setting their intercompany 
transfer prices, for example by having corporations located in high-tax countries buy at a 
high price and sell at a low price when trading with affiliated corporations in low-tax 
countries.   
Taxing authorities in high-tax countries attempt to defend their tax bases by 
establishing transfer pricing rules that constrain this type of cross-country income 
shifting, and there is a continual cat-and-mouse game between multinationals and the 
taxing authorities over transfer pricing.  The most difficult transfer prices involve 
intangibles whose value is difficult to establish (e.g., brand names) and whose taxable 
income can be easily shifted.  Thus, tax minimization opportunities for transfer pricing   35 
are greatest among multinationals with high profit margins from intangibles, e.g., 
research and development.  The classic example is the pharmaceutical industry.    
The tax uncertainties associated with these companies provides some book 
discretion.  Since transfer prices are very difficult to establish and subject to continual 
scrutiny by taxing authorities around the globe, it is very difficult to estimate the eventual 
worldwide taxes that will be paid, following possible audits in multiple jurisdictions.  
Thus, companies typically accrue a liability for the uncertainty surrounding transfer 
prices.  Over time, resolution is reached about the tax liability, albeit sometimes years 
later.  In the meantime, the uncertainty surrounding the eventual resolution of the tax 
liability gives the company some leeway is estimating its book tax provision.  This is 
sometimes referred to as “cushion.”  Historically it has been viewed as an important 
means of managing earnings (Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mills, 2004; Blouin and Tuna, 
2006).   
To summarize, engaging in transactions that inherently result in uncertainty about 
the tax liability provides not only tax discretion (e.g., the ability to use transfer prices to 
shift income from high-tax countries to low-tax countries), but also provides book 
discretion.  Thus, investments in intangibles that can cross jurisdictions carry the added 
benefit of facilitating both tax and earnings management. 
 
4.4.  Tax shelters 
In the absence of book income concerns, in this framework a firm should pursue 
any activity that affects multiple categories of cash flows such that the present discounted 
value of the sums of those after-tax cash flows increases.  Ths applies to shifting from 
taxable to tax-exempt bonds when the implicit tax rate on the tax-exempt bonds is less 
than the explicit tax rate on taxable bonds; in this case the shift would lower pre-tax 
income but reduce the effective tax rate by even more.  It also applies to complicated 
“pure” tax shelters that lower the present discounted value of tax payments but leave the 
present discounted value of pre-tax cash flows unaffected.  If book income matters, either 
because of divergence costs, or per se (i.e., M2 and/or M3 are non-zero), then a given tax 
shelter becomes less attractive to the extent that it reduces after-tax book income in an 
attempt to reduce taxable income.  Thus, some commentators have argued that the   36 
“perfect” tax shelter also either increases, or leaves unaffected, after-tax book income 
(see Weisbach, 2002).  Of course, conformity would eliminate both the pure and the 
perfect tax shelter because any reduction in taxable income would cause an equivalent 
decline in book income.  Whether the firm could successfully signal, outside of standard 
financial accounting, that the book earnings understate “true” earnings, is another 
question. 
Tax shelters also are used to boost current book earnings even if there is no 
reduction in actual current tax payments.  As discussed above, a book tax provision is 
recorded when transactions result in future tax payments.  Thus, a firm may undertake a 
tax shelter that reduces future tax payments, but has no effect on current tax liabilities, 
perhaps because the firm has net operating loss carryforwards.  If so, its book tax 
provision will fall, increasing current book earnings, but its current tax liability will be 
unaffected.
31 
   
 
5.  Policy 
The effect of tax changes that are equivalent in the standard economic model may 
not be the same when accounting considerations enter.  Ignoring these book 
considerations can lead economists to be surprised both at the behavioral response to tax 
policy and at the policies that business interests favor.  As an example of the latter, 
                                                 
31 Such “book” tax shelters reportedly were common at Enron in the late 1990s.  The Joint Committee on 
Taxation’s 2003 study following the company’s collapse states that: 
 
“Although providing financial accounting benefits, the early structured transactions, 
including the commodity prepay transactions, were primarily engaged in for Federal 
income tax benefits.  However, as Enron began to report losses for Federal income tax 
purposes, the importance of immediate tax deductions declined.  At the same time, the 
importance of financial accounting income to Enron increased.  As a result, Enron’s 
focus shifted from structured transactions that could shelter specific tax items to 
transactions that could generate financial accounting benefits.  
 
“Arguably, the primary reason for engaging in most of the subsequent structured 
transactions after 1996 was for the financial accounting benefits they generated rather 
than the Federal income tax benefits.  Indeed, many of the structured transactions were 
designed to permit Enron to begin reporting the financial accounting benefits of a 
transaction immediately even though the Federal income tax benefits (which generated 
the financial accounting benefit) would not occur until significantly into the future.” 
(Joint Committee on Taxation, 2003, pp. 102-103.) 
   37 
consider two alternative tax policies that are designed to make investment more 
attractive—a decline in the corporate tax rate versus immediate expensing for tax 
purposes.  It is clear that both a reduction in marginal tax rates and a postponement of tax 
payments increase the attractiveness of a real investment decision, and that there is some 
level of rate reduction that would have the same effect on the incentive to invest as 
immediate expensing (i.e., postponement of tax payments).   
Neubig (2006) shows that, once financial accounting implications are considered,   
the lower corporate tax rate generally dominates expensing.  The reason is that, even if 
the present values of the after-tax cash flows from the investment are identical with a rate 
reduction, the lower tax rate accelerates book profits.  That is, the present value of book 
earnings is greater with a lower tax rate than with expensing.  This occurs because 
expensing does not change the book tax provision, i.e., the reduction in book profits for 
past, present and future taxes.  On the other hand, a lower statutory corporate tax rate 
immediately reduces the tax rate applied to current book profits, lowering the book tax 
provision.  Furthermore, it lowers the tax that is expected to be levied on future tax 
liabilities.  Thus, if the firm has more deferred (or future) tax liabilities than deferred tax 
assets, as is the case for most firms, then there is a further boost to earnings because the 
deferred tax liabilities are revalued using the new corporate tax rate and the change is 
included as accounting income.
32  Of course, for those companies where the deferred tax 
assets exceed the deferred tax liabilities, the firm’s book income falls with a rate 
reduction and thus they would be more likely to oppose a lower tax rate.
33  
Another current policy debate concerns conformity, i.e., the requirement that book 
and taxable income be the same.  Firms currently report taxable income to the IRS 
according to tax law, and report book income to the public according to GAAP.  The 
                                                 
32 This accounting issue is reminiscent of the distinction in economic analysis between the effects of a tax 
change on “old capital” versus “new capital.”  Other things equal, the bang (i.e., increased incentive to 
invest) per buck (i.e., revenue lost) of an investment tax credit or accelerated depreciation exceeds that of a 
tax rate cut because the latter provides tax relief for income generated by past investments, which is wasted 
in terms of providing an incentive to future investment.  The effect on the value of deferred tax assets or 
liabilities reflects the impact on the value of the corporation of the tax implications of past investments, or 
“old capital.” 
33 The detrimental effects of a rate cut on the book earnings of certain companies in financial distress that 
had substantial deferred tax assets is said to have been an important reason why the tax relief for domestic 
manufacturing in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 was enacted in the form of a percentage 
deduction of a taxpayer’s gross receipts, rather than as a rate cut.   38 
move for conformity is partly a response to the fact that these two sets of reports have 
been diverging in recent years, leading many analysts to conclude that firms are 
systematically inflating earnings and avoiding taxes.  Advocates of conformity suggest 
that folding both systems into one would reduce the incentive to manage earnings (since 
taxes would be owed on any fictitious earnings), reduce tax avoidance, as well as reduce 
compliance costs because it eliminates the need to make two separate calculations of 
income.  Opponents point out that book income, despite its many problems, is a strong 
signal of firm value to the investing public, and they are concerned that reforms might 
lower the quality of that signal.
34   
The model developed here adds a new wrinkle to this debate.  Not only would 
conformity affect the book reporting of income and the taxable income reported to the 
IRS for any set of underlying real operations, it would affect these real decisions 
themselves.  Firms will be less likely to engage in real activities that give them more 
discretion to report current book income if it also necessarily increases current tax 
payments.  Whether that is a good thing or a bad thing is not obvious, though, and 
depends on whether or not the book income and discretion advantages of an asset move 
the firm's choice of D away from or towards the social optimum.  For example, a firm 
may be deciding the optimal level of investment in a foreign asset.  In the absence of 
taxes and financial accounting concerns, the firm would choose D*.  Before considering 
book income or shifting, but given the lower rate of return induced by taxation, firms 
would choose D'<D*.  Next, suppose that higher levels of D boost book income or 
increase discretion in periods when that is especially valuable, .  It is quite possible that 
the new optimum, call it D**, is closer to the social optimum, D'<D**<D*.
35  In such a 
case, book and discretion considerations may partially offset the distortions of the tax 
code, implying that financial accounting considerations move the firm towards the social 
optimum. 
Whether or not conformity is welfare improving will depend on whether or not 
book considerations exacerbate or offset the distortions induced by the tax code, and we 
                                                 
34 There are several versions of conformity that might be implemented, and we do not attempt to distinguish 
between them here.  See Hanlon, Laplante, and Shevlin (2005) and Hanlon and Maydew (2006) for 
overviews. 
35 Of course, there is no reason to rule out the possibility that D**>D*, or that D**<D*.   39 
have argued that the answer to this latter question is non-trivial.  Our framework is, 
however, only a first step in adequately addressing this question, in part because in our 
reduced form approach, it is impossible to make comprehensive welfare statements.  If 
firms value book income because they are able to fool the market, then the investing 
public may gain from conformity, even if it pushes firms away from optimal actions in a 
partial equilibrium model.  If book income is valued because it is a superior signal of firm 
value, then the information content of the economy may be damaged by conformity.  
Likewise, adequate analysis of the opportunity cost of investment decisions requires 
general equilibrium analysis.  Nevertheless, we think that our framework provides fresh 




As long as book income has value to public corporations, real decisions that 
facilitate book earnings management are more attractive than otherwise, and especially so 
to companies for which this discretion has relatively high value.  Decisions that enhance 
the discretion of tax payments may also be more attractive than otherwise, especially to 
companies that face time-varying marginal tax rates.  The source of this discretion may 
be either the accounting rules or the tax law.  It is critical to know whether the book and 
tax accounting either must be conformed by law, or will be conformed by choice because 
of the private costs of maintaining separate accounting systems.  When they are not 
conformed, divergence between the two may be costly to the extent that it alerts the IRS 
to possibly aggressive tax planning or the capital markets to poor earnings quality. 
The formal model of this paper is offered in the hope that it will facilitate 
discussion of these types of issues in a rigorous, general framework.  We recognize that 
the framework is still not general enough to capture potentially important aspects of the 
interaction between accounting and real decisions.  For example, it does not model the 
underlying nature of the information asymmetry between corporate insiders and (actual 
and potential) shareholders to explain why book income enhances shareholder value.  
This may, or may not, affect the model’s positive conclusions, but certainly affects its 
normative implications.  Ideally one would like to integrate a model of the kind offered   40 
here with a model of the institutions that arise (e.g., performance-based executive 
compensation, audited financial reports, and other governance mechanisms) to address 
the information symmetry between shareholders and the managers of the corporation. 
Nor does it place the firm's decisions within a general equilibrium setting that 
recognizes that tax code and accounting rule changes may affect the prices a corporation 
faces, and that U.S. public corporations compete against unincorporated U.S. businesses 
and foreign companies, including foreign multinationals.  This prevents the model from 
addressing issues such as whether the information requirements of public corporations 
affect the decision of a business to be a public corporation.  Nor does the model 
satisfactorily integrate the type of legitimate tax planning and earnings management 
stressed here with the use of aggressive—and possibly illegal—tax shelters, outright 
evasion, and fraudulent financial reporting.  A similar question to the one this paper 
addresses arises in that context: is the gain from corporate tax avoidance inframarginal, or 
does it reduce the marginal tax rate on new investment?  The answer depends on whether 
the real decision is what Slemrod (2001) calls avoidance-facilitating.  If more investment 
(i.e., scale) enables more sheltering, then there is an implicit subsidy to investment. 
Ideally, an overarching conceptual framework can help to integrate the findings of 
the active empirical research in this area.  It would, for example, be helpful to know 
whether the goal of a given empirical exercise is to provide estimates of the trade-off 
between real and book income, and what mediates that trade-off, or whether the goal is to 
measure the value of an accounting constraint and how much the loosening (tightening) 
of the constraint reduces (increases) the effective cost of a real decision.  Accomplishing 
that task will raise the likelihood that new research will build upon itself to produce a 
coherent, empirically fleshed-out picture of the interactions among the policy choices of 
tax and accounting regulatory authorities and the real and accounting decisions of 
corporations.     41 
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